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Multilinear maps are a very powerful tool in cryptography. Nonetheless,
to date, only three types of multilinear maps have been published relying on
a graded encoding scheme. The first candidate is proposed by Garg, Gen-
try, and Halevi (GGH) relying on an ideal lattice [GGH13a], the second
one is defined on integers as established by Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi
(CLT) [CLT13], and the last one is provided by Gentry, Gorbunov, and Halevi
(GGH15) relying on a graph induced graded encoding scheme [GGH15].
These multilinear maps have led to a number of applications in cryptogra-
phy such as one round key exchange protocol, witness encryptions, and even
indistinguishable obfuscations. The security of the applications depends on
some hardness problems derived from a graded encoding scheme.
However, none of them have reduction to well-known hard problems. For
that reasons, many researches attempt to investigate the hardness of the
problems. Actually, when low-level encodings of zero are given, the GGH
scheme is known to be insecure by Hu and Jia [HJ16] and the last candidate
of a multilinear map GGH15 is known to be insecure [CLLT16].
In the thesis, we describe an algebraic analysis on the hardness problems
of two GGH and CLT multilinear maps. Common to two candidates are
i
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constructed by graded encoding schemes and provide an additional public
information zerotesting parameter, which is used to determine whether the
hidden message is zero or not. Exploiting the structure of graded encoding
scheme and additional input, we study how to solve the hardness problems
in three cases.
First, we show another approach to break the GGH scheme with low level
encodings of zero. According to the original GGH paper, finding a short vec-
tor for a given principal ideal lattice enables to break the scheme. Therefore,
the parameters are set to be invulnerable to the best known algorithm for
finding a short vector on ideal lattice. By proposing an improved lattice re-
duction algorithm to find a short vector, we prove that the multilinear map
is broken within quasi polynomial time of the suggested parameters.
Second, we describe that how to construct a level-0 encoding of zero
from GGH public parameter without level encodings of zero in the quasi-
polynomial time of the suggested parameters. The obtained encoding of zero
serves as a low level encoding of zero in the first study. Thus we also show
that GGH without low level encodings of zero is insecure.
Finally, for CLT scheme with low level encodings of zero, we attempt to
reveal the all secret elements of scheme in polynomial time. By multiplying
encodings of zero to zerotesting parameter appropriately, one can obtain an
integer matrix of secret quantities. Next we recover the secret elements by
computing eigenvalues.
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Multilinear maps are one of the important primitives in cryptography. Since
Boneh and Silverberg formalized cryptographic multilinear maps in 2003 [BS03],
various cryptographic applications have been proposed using multilinear map
such as one round multi-party key exchange protocol, a witness encryption
scheme, and indistinguishable obfuscation [BS03, GLW14, GGH`13b]. Be-
cause these applications are a long standing open problems, designing mul-
tilinear maps has become an important research topic. Unfortunately, for a
long time, it fails to produce secure multilinear maps and such applications
could not actually be realized.
A decade later, in 2013, Garg, Gentry Halevi [GGH13a] introduced the
new concept of (approximate) graded encoding scheme and proposed the con-
struction of multilinear maps by using the graded encoding scheme. Moreover,
by designing the graded encoding schemes relying on an ideal lattice they de-
scribed the first candidate of multilinear maps as GGH scheme. Soon after,
Coron et al. introduced another candidate of multilinear map by designing
a new graded encoding schemes over the integers as CLT scheme [CLT13].
Both schemes are share similarity, which one is to provide extra public data
called the zero-testing or extraction parameter, which allow to publicly de-
1
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cide whether the message of the given encoding is zero or not. The GGH
scheme and CLT scheme lead us to realize the various applications based on
multilinear maps.
The security of the applications rely on 4 types of new hardness assump-
tions such as Graded Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (GDDH), Deci-
sional Linear problem (DLIN), Subgroup Membership problem (SubM), and
Graded External Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (GXDH), which are served
from graded encoding schemes. These problems have been initially used in
the context of cryptographic bilinear maps [Sco02, BBS04, BGN05].
Unfortunately, in case of the GGH scheme with low grade encoding of
zeros (i.e. low level encoding of zeros), it was realized that the hardness
problems could be broken in polynomial-time by using called zeroizing at-
tack. [HJ16, GGH13a]. Briefly, The attack consists in multiplying the en-
coding of zero and zero-testing parameters for a given encoding of m allows
us to obtain multiples of m exactly. This value serves to solve all related
problems of GGH schemes. The more details were described in original pa-
per [HJ16, GGH13a].
On the other hand, in the case of CLT, since the attack algorithm us-
ing the encoding of zero is not known, the presumed hardness of the CLT
instantiations of GDDH, SubM, DLIN and GXDH was exploited as a se-
curity grounding for several cryptographic constructions [ABP15, BLMR13,
GLSW15, Zim15]. Whereas the both schemes without low grade encodings
of zero are still known to be hard.
Soon after, a third candidate construction of a variant of graded encoding
schemes was proposed in [GGH15]. And at a similar time, a new CLT mul-
tilinear maps [CLT15] are proposed. Unfortunately, these schemes are also




In this thesis, we provide an algebraic analysis of the hardness problems de-
pended on multilinear maps. First of all, we abstract the problems of the
GGH scheme to shortest vector problem on ideal lattice or Overstretched
NTRU problem. In case of CLT scheme, we reduce the CRT-ACD with aux-
iliary input. Next we describe an analysis of the problems.
1.2.1 Analysis of the GGH scheme
GGH with low level encodings of zero
As mentioned above, the GGH scheme with low level encodings of zero was
broken by Hu and Jia [HJ16]. In this thesis, we provide another approach
to analysis of the scheme. According to original GGH paper [GGH13a, Sec.
6.3.3], for a secret element g of the GGH scheme, if one can finds a short
element of b P xgy such that }b} ď q1{4, the GDDH problems is not secure.
In other words, the GDDH problem are reduced to shortest vector problem
(SVP) on lattice. More precisely, let R be a ring ZrXs{xXn ` 1y and xgy




gi P R. For a generator g, by identifying






Moreover, one can consider the principal ideal xgy as a lattice generated by
tg,g ¨X, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,g ¨Xn´1u. Given a basis of the lattice xgy, SVP on ideal lattice
is to find an short element b of an ideal xgy.
As the first contribution of this thesis, we improve a lattice reduction
algorithm to find a short vector. The algorithm is called by sublattice algo-
rithm. Generally, a lattice basis reduction algorithm Aδ with a root Hermite
factor δ on n-dimensional lattice L outputs a lattice point b P L such that
}b} ď δn ¨ detpLq1{n. When the determinant of an integral lattice is less
than δn
2
, we propose an algorithm to obtain a lattice point b such that
}b} ď 22¨
?
log δ¨log detL. This algorithms run in time of algorithm Aδ with poly-
3
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nomial time of the dimension n and logpdetLq. The main idea is to reduce a
SVP on a lattice L to one on its sublattice whose determinant is bounded by
that of L. This technique was used to orthogonal lattice attacks on Learning
with Errors or Small Integer Solution problems where the lattice dimension
can be taken flexible without increasing determinant [MR09] Our idea is not
bounded to specific attacks and can be applied to any integral lattices.
In general, the determinant of a sublattice may be smaller or larger than
that of the original lattice. Our idea is to use the Hermite normal form (HNF)
to obtain a sublattice with bounded determinant. The HNF of an integral
lattice is a unique (generalized) lower-triangular matrix, the columns of which
form a basis of the lattice and it can be computed in polynomial time from
any basis of the lattice [MW01]. We show that the sublattice generated by
the last m columns has a smaller determinant than that of the original lattice
for any positive integer m ď n. For example, by applying LLL algorithm to
this sublattice of appropriate m, we obtain a short vector, the size of which is
upper-bounded by 2
?
log detL, which is smaller than the shortest vector from
LLL when the determinant of L is smaller than 2n
2{4. We may apply any
approximate SVP algorithm to our algorithm instead of LLL, including the
BKZ algorithm. Our algorithm with BKZ of block size polylogpλq breaks the
GGH scheme with the security parameter λ.
GGH with top level encodings of zero
In case of the GGH scheme with top level encodings of zero, we observe
that the GDDH problem is transformed to Overstretched NTRU problem
(ONTRU). Let f and g be polynomials of a bounded Euclidean coefficient
in the ring ZrXs{xXn ` 1y with a power of two n. Given the polynomial
rf{gsq P ZqrXs{xXn`1y, the NTRU problem is to find a, b P ZrXs{xXn`1y
with a small Euclidean coefficient such that ra{bsq “ rf{gsq. When, q is a
super polynomial on security parameter λ, it is called by ONTRU problem
and which is introduced in [ABD16].
In order to solve the ONTRU, we provide so called subfield algorithm and
4
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hybrid algorithm combining the subfield and sublattice algorithm. In detail,
when n is Oplog2 qq and }g}, }f}, }g´1} are Opnq, we propose an algorithm to
solve the ONTRU problem, which runs in 2Oplog
2 qq time. The main technique
of our algorithm is the reduction of a problem on a field to one in a subfield
with trace map. Concurrently and independently, Albrecht et al. suggest a
very similar algorithm and hold same results by using norm map instead
of trace [ABD16]. In the GGH scheme without low-level encodings of zero,
our algorithm can be directly applied to attack this scheme if we have some
top-level encodings of zero. Using our algorithm, we can construct a level-0
encoding of zero and utilize it to attack a security ground of this scheme in
the quasi-polynomial time of its security parameter suggested by [GGH13a]
In addition, we suggest an improvement of the subfield attack by com-
bining the sublattice algorithm and subfield algorithm. Our attack reduces











in the previous. Our Hybrid attack implies
that the degree should be increased from n to 32n
27
in order to maintain the
same security level in the cryptosystems based on the ONTRU problems.
1.2.2 Analysis of the CLT scheme
Although the CLT scheme also exposes low level encodings of zero, the scheme
has no way of attacking with zero encodings. In this thesis, we first define
a new problem CRT-ACD with auxiliary input (CRT-ACDwAI) and reduce
from the CLT scheme with low level encodings of zero to CRT-ACDwAI.
The CRT-ACDwAI is to find η-bit primes pi for all 1 ď i ď n for given
many samples in the form of CRTpp1,¨¨¨ ,pnqpr1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , rnq which is an integer









When 3 log |ri| ` 1 ă η, we describe an algorithm to solve the CRT-
ACDwAI. The algorithm runs in polynomial-time and allows one to publicly
compute all pi, which is also secret parameters of the CLT scheme. By adapt-
ing the zeroizing attack to CLT scheme, one can reduce from public parame-
ters of CLT scheme to CRT-ACDwAI. It implies that any quantities involving
5
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the kept secret of the CLT scheme are recovered. Additionally we describe





can be used to solve the SubM, DLIN, GXDH for CLT scheme.
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First of all, we define some notations to be used and basic notions related to
multilinear maps.
2.1 Notations.
For an integer q, we use the notation Zq :“ Z{pqZq and rRsq :“ ZqrXs{xXn`




















i and }u} denote the Euclidean norm of u.




this map to rRsq by applying it to each coefficient. By abuse of notation, we
omit ι unless it will be confused when identifying rxsq P Zq with an integer
x when ´ q
2
ă x ď q
2
.
Throughout this paper, we assume that an integer n is a power of 2.
Then, K :“ QrXs{xXn ` 1y is a number field with the ring of integers
R :“ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y. In particular, K is a Galois extension of Q, and we
denote the Galois group of K over Q by GalpK{Qq. As in the technical





i P K, we consider it to be a column
vector ph0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , hn´1q
T . When we need an inverse of an element a P R, we
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usually consider the inverse inK with the notation a´1. If we want to consider
it in rRsq and not in K, then we denote it by ra
´1sq. We use bold letters to
denote vectors or ring elements in Zn or R.
2.2 Graded encoding Schemes and Multilin-
ear map Procedure.
We first recall the formal definition of multilinear map suggested by Boneh
and Silverberg [BS03].
Definition 2.2.1 (Multilinear maps [BS03]). For κ`1 cyclic groupsG1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Gκ,
and GT of the same order p, an κ-multilinear map e : G1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Gκ Ñ GT
has the following properties:
1. For an element a P Zp and tgi P Giu1ďiďκ, it holds:
epg1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , a ¨ gi, ¨ ¨ ¨ , gκq “ a ¨ epg1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , gi, ¨ ¨ ¨ , gκq.
2. If the elements gi is a generator of Gi, respectively, then epg1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , gκq
is a generator of GT .
In the original definition [BS03], the cyclic group are set as same group
G1 “ G2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Gκ, which is called symmetric multilinear maps. The
asymmetric multilinear maps with different Gi’s are considered in [GGH13a].
Throughout this thesis, we generally deal with symmetric case, and only with
asymmetric case if necessary.
Unfortunately, when κ ě 3, none of the multilinear maps are published
matched to the formal definition of multilinear maps. At 2013, instead of
a formal definition, Garg et al. proposed a new concept ”graded encoding
scheme” and proposed an approximate multilinear maps by exploiting the
graded encoding scheme. After that, GGH and CLT (approximate) multilin-
ear maps are provided by constructing a graded encoding scheme relying on
8
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ideal lattice and integers, respectively. Now we describe the formal definition
of a κ-graded encoding scheme referring to original paper [GGH13a].
Definition 2.2.2 (Graded Encoding Scheme [GGH13a]). A κ-Graded En-
coding Scheme for a commutative ring R is a system of sets S “ tS
pαq
i P
t0, 1u˚ : 1 ď i ď κ, α P Ru, with the following properties
1. For every 1 ď i ď κ, the sets tS
pαq
i : α P Ru are disjoint.
2. There are binary operations ` and ´ (on t0, 1u˚) such that for every
α1, α2 P R, every 1 ď i ď κ, and every u1 P S
pα1q




u1 ` u2 P S
pα1`α2q
i and u1 ´ u2 P S
pα1´α2q
i ,
where α1 ` α2 and α1 ´ α2 are addition and subtraction in R.
3. There in an associative binary operation ˆ (on t0, 1u˚) such that for
every α1, α2 P R, every 1 ď i, j ď κ with 0 ď i ` j ď κ, and every
u1 P S
pα1q
i and u2 P S
pα2q
j , it holds that
u1 ˆ u2 P S
pα1¨α2q
i`j ,
where α1 ¨ α2 is multiplication in R.
Throughout this thesis, we denote a level-i encoding of m as enctpmq. The
main difference between multilinear maps and graded encoding scheme is two
fold; one is that the encodings has a level (or grade). The set Sαi means that
level i encoding of α. The second main difference is that the encodings in
graded encoding scheme are randomized whereas the encodings of multilinear
maps are deterministic. It implies that a ring element α can be encoded many
ways.
Since the image of multilinear map is a deterministic function for a ring
element α’s only, it needs additional procedure to erase the randomness.
9
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In [GGH13a] and [CLT13], by providing a zerotesting procedure, they delete
the randomness and enable to construct a multilinear map. Now we de-
scribe a multilinear map procedure using graded encoding scheme; we refer
to [GGH13a] As previously we consider only the symmetric case.
Multilinear map Procedure.
Instance Generation. The randomized InstGenp1λ, 1κq takes as inputs the
parameters λ and κ, and outputs (params, pzt), where params is a description
of a κ-Graded Encoding System as above, and pzt is a zero-test parameter.
Ring Sampler. The randomized samp(params) outputs a level-zero encoding
a P Sα0 for a nearly uniform element α PR R. Note that the encoding a does
not need to be uniform in Sα0 .
Encoding. The (possibly randomized) enc(params, a) takes as input a level-
zero encoding a Sα0 for some α P S
α
0 , and outputs the level-one encoding
u P Sα1 for some α.
Re-Randomization. The randomized reRand(params, i, u) re-randomizes
encodings relative to the same level i. Specifically, given a level-l encoding
u P S
pαq
l , it outputs another encoding u0 P S
pαq
l . Moreover for any two u1, u2 P
S
pαq
l , the output distributions of reRand(params, i, u1) and reRand(params, i,
u2) are nearly the same.
Addition and negation. Given params and two encodings relative to the
same level, u1 P S
pα1q
l and u2 P S
pα2q
l , we have add(params, u1, u2)P S
pα1`α2q
l
and neg(params, u1)P S
p´α1q
l . Below we write u1`u2 and ´u1 as a shorthand
for applying these procedures.
Multiplication. For u1 P S
pα1q
i and u2 P S
pα2q
j , we have mul(params, u1,
u2)“ u1 ˆ u2 P S
pα1¨α2q
i`j .




Extraction. The procedure extracts a random function of ring elements from





1. For any α P R and u1, u2 P S
pαq
κ , ext(params, pzt, u1)= ext(params, pzt,
u2).
2. The distribution text(params, pzt, u): α PR R, u P S
pαq
κ u is nearly uni-
form over t0, 1uλ.
In the original [GGH13a] paper, the authors provide a slightly weak defini-
tions of isZero and ext, where isZero can output 1 even for top level encoding
of some nonzero element with negligible probability, and ext can output dif-
ferent outputs for top level encodings of same element, also with negligible
probability. In this sense, a multilinear map relying on a graded encoding
scheme is a approximate function.
2.3 Hardness Problems.
Finally, we recall the hardness problems and its related problems for multi-
linear maps underlying on graded encoding scheme. described in [GGH13a].
First, we introduce a hardness assumption for multilinear maps, graded deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH) problem. Briefly, given a set of κ`1 level-one
encodings of random elements, it is to distinguish between a level-κ encodings
of their product and a random element.
Definition 2.3.1 (Graded Decisional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH)). For an ad-
versary A and parameters λ, κ we consider the following process:
Generating public parameter: (params, pzt) Ð InstGenp1
λ, 1κq
Sampling: Choose aj Ð samppparamsq for all 0 ď j ď κ
Encoding: Set uj ÐreRand(params, 1, enc(params, 1, aj)) for all 0 ď j ď κ
Random sampling: Choose bÐ samppparamsq





Random value at level-κ: Set û “reRand(params, κ, b)




DDDH “ tparams,pzt, u0, . . . , uκ, uu and DR “ tparams,pzt, u0, . . . , uκ, ûu.
Remark As mentioned previously, the many applications of multilinear maps
rely on several problems such as SubM, DLIN, GXDH. In the first public ver-
sion of [GGH13a] (dated 29 Oct. 2012),˚ the GGH construction was thought
to provide secure SubM, DLIN, and GXDH instantiation. It was soon real-
ized that these problems could be broken in polynomial-time. Therefore, we
only introduce these problems and analysis for the CLT version in Section 4.3
˚It can be accessed from the IACR eprint server.
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Multilinear maps over the Ideal
Lattices and Its Analysis
In this chapter, we introduce GGH multilinear maps and its analysis. The
GGH scheme are provided relying on ideal lattices. Basically, its underlying
set is a polynomial quotient ring R “ ZrXs{xXn` 1y with a power of two n.
Let xgy Ă R be an principal ideal generated by a secret short element g P R,
and Rq :“ R{xq ¨ Ry for a fixed large integer q. Then a message space and a
ciphertext space are defined by R{xgy and Rq, respectively.
Because the GGH schme is constructed by a graded encoding scheme, it
provide a zero-testing parameter and its encodings are defined with level. In
GGH scheme, the level-t encoding of m P R and zerotesting parameter are
of the form:
enctpmq “






where r is a short random element and z,h are fixed secret elements. In the
original GGH paper, the authors observe that if one can find a short element
of xgy, the GGH scheme becomes insecure. Therefore in this chapter, we focus
on how to recover the short element of xgy from public parameters and use
it to break the GGH scheme.
13
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AND ITS ANALYSIS
3.1 GGH13 Multilinear maps
First, we briefly recall the Garg et al. GGH construction. We refer to the
original paper [GGH13a] for a complete description. The scheme relies on
the following parameters.
λ: the security parameter
κ: the multilinearity parameter
σ: the basic Gaussian parameter for drawing the ideal generator g
σ1: the Gaussian parameter for sampling level-zero elements
σ˚: the Gaussian parameter for constructing nonzero level elements
m: the number of encodings of zero in the public parameters at each
level.
q: the modulus of a ciphertext
n: the dimension of a base ring
Instance generation: pparams,pztq Ð InstGenp1
λ, 1κq.
For a given λ and κ, InstGenp1λ, 1κq outputs the following elements.
Sample g Ð DR,σ until }g}, }g´1} ď n2 and, I “ xgy is a prime ideal in R.
Sample z ÐR Rq.













for all 1 ď i ď κ, 1 ď j ď m.








Then publish params “ pn, q, κ,y, txijuq and pzt.
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AND ITS ANALYSIS
Sampling level-zero encodings: a Ð samppparamsq.
To sample a valid level-0 encoding a, we draw an element from DI,σ1 . In other
words, a Ð DI,σ1 .
Encodings at higher levels: ci Ð encpparams, i, cq.
Given a level-j encoding c for j ă i, we draw an m integers rk Ð DZ,σ˚
1 ď k ď m and compute ci “
„








Adding and multiplying encodings:
Given two encodings c1 and c2 of the same level, the sum of c1 and c2 is
computed by Add(c1, c2)=rc1 ` c2sq. Given two encodings c1 and c2, we
multiply c1 and c2 by Mul(c1, c2)=rc1 ¨ c2sq.
Zero testing: isZeropparams, pzt, cq
?
“ 0{1.
To test given a level-κ encoding c is zero or not, we compute }rpzt ¨ csq}8. So
zerotesting procedure returns 1 if }rpzt ¨ csq}8 ă q
3{4; otherwise, return 0.
Extraction: v Ð extpparams, pzt, cq.
To extract a canonical representation of a coset from an encoding u “ rc{zκsq,
we just multiply by the zero-testing parameter pzt, collect the plog qq{4`λ
most-significant bits of each of the n coefficients of the result. In other words,
for given a level-κ encoding c, compute MSBlog q{4´λprpzt ¨ csqq.
This works because for any two encodings u,u1 of the same coset we have
}pzt ¨ u´ pzt ¨ u
1
} “ }pzt ¨ pu´ u
1
q} ă q3{4,
therefore we guarantee pzt ¨ u, pzt ¨ u
1 to agree on their plog qq{4`λ most sig-
nificant bits without negligible probability.
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Hardness Assumptions
We recall the definitions of the graded decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
(GDDH) for GGH scheme and its computational variant GCDH. They do
not seem to be reducible to more classical assumptions in generic ways.
For an adversary A and the parameters λ and κ, we consider the follow-
ing process in the GGH scheme.
1. Choose (n, q, κ, txκju, pzt) Ð InstGen(1
λ, 1κ).
2. Sample mi Ð samppparamsq for each 0 ď i ď κ.
3. Set ui “




Ð encpparams, 1, miq for all 0 ď i ď κ.
4. Choose r Ð DR,σ1 .



























The GDDH problem is to distinguish between two distributions, DDDH and
DR, where
DDDH “ tq, txiu,pzt,u0, . . . ,uκ, ûu and DR “ tq, txiu,pzt,u0, . . . ,uκ,uu.




mi ` I given the
inputs
tq, txiu,pzt,u0, . . . ,uκu.
Parameter Settings.




λn, σ1 “ λn3{2: to bound the size of g and level-1 encodings. It
means that with overwhelming probability }g} ď n
?
λ and }a}, }bij} ď
16
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λn2.
‚ σ˚ “ 2λ, m “ Opn2q: so that the distribution of level-1 encoding u is
independent to its re-randomized one of u1.
‚ q ě 28κλ ¨ nOpκq: to valid zero test, we need to q1{8 larger than the size
of denominator of level-κ encodings.
‚ n “ Õpκλ2q: to thwart lattice reduction attacks.
3.2 Basic Notions
In this section, we introduce basic notions related to analysis of GGH scheme.
Lattices.
An m-dimensional lattice of rank n is the set of all integer combinations
t
řn
i“1 xibi | xi P Zu of n linear independent vectors b1, . . . ,bn P Rm. The
set of bi’s is called a basis of L. If n “ m, L is called a full rank lattice. A
sublattice is a subset L1 Ă L that is also a lattice. A matrix B “ rb1 ¨ ¨ ¨bns
is a basis matrix of a lattice L. If L Ă Zn, we call it an integral lattice. In
this study, we only focus on integral lattices.
Given a lattice L in Rm with a basis matrix B, the determinant of the
lattice is defined as
a
detpBTBq, where BT is the transpose matrix of B
and detpMq denotes the determinant of a square matrix M . By abusing the
notations, detL is used to denote the determinant of L. The i-th successive
minimum of a lattice L, denoted by λipLq, is defined by
λipLq “ min
r
tr : dimpspanpLXBprqqq ě iu,
where Bprq : tx P Rn : }x} ď ru.
Given a basis tb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bnu, we denote by b
˚
1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,b
˚
n the output of the
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the basis, i.e., b˚i is the component of bi
orthogonal to spanpb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bi´1q.
17
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Ideal lattice.
For an element g P R, we denote the principal ideal in R generated by g by




i P R with a vector pgn´1, gn´2, . . . , g0q
T in Zn, we can apply
lattice theory to the algebraic ring R and algebraic ring theory to the ideal
lattice xgy. For a polynomial u P R and a basis B :“ tb1,b2, . . . ,bnu, we
denote the reduction of u modulo the fundamental region of lattice B by
u mod B; that is, u mod B is the unique representation of u P R such that




αibi for αi P p´1{2, 1{2s. For the
polynomials u,v P R, we use the notation u mod v as u mod V , where V




















To find a short element of a lattice, lattice reduction algorithms such as
the LLL algorithm and the BKZ algorithm are described in [LLL82, HPS11,
ADRSD14]. These algorithms lead us to find an approximately short vector
of a lattice with bounded time.
In the case of the BKZ algorithm, by [HPS11], the quality of the al-
gorithms relies on the block size β. More precisely, using the BKZ algo-




2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,b
1
nu, which satisfies:




2 ¨ pdetLq 1n in polypn, sizepBqq ¨ CHKZpβq times or






n in polypn, sizepBqq ¨ CHKZpβq times,
where L is the lattice LpBq, γβ ď β is the Hermite constant of rank β, sizepBq
is the size of the largest entries of the basis matrix B, and CHKZpβq “ 2Opβq
is the cost of HKZ-reduction in dimension β. For an output b11 of lattice
18
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as a Hermite factor and
approximate factor, respectively.
For convenience of calculation, throughout this paper, we assume that
we have a lattice reduction algorithm Aδ , whose output contains a short
vector b with Euclidean norm less than δn ¨ detpLq1{n or δ2n ¨ λ1pLq for an












3.3 Attack on GGH with low level encodings
of zero
In this section, we explain an attack algorithm, which is a different approach
from [HJ16], to solve the GDDH problem of the GGH scheme with low-level
encodings of zero
Now we are given a set
tn, q, κ, y, txiju,pzt,u0 “ enc1pm0q, . . . ,uκ “ enc1pmκq,wu,
where w is a challenge element and it can be written of the form encκpr ¨
śκ
i“1 miq. Then our attack algorithm consists of the following four steps:
• First, find a basis of an ideal lattice xgy.
• Second, compute a short element d ¨ g P xgy
• Third, recover an short element r1 from w and d¨g such that r1´r P xgy
• Last, determine whether an element r1 ¨ y ´ u0 is an encoding of zero
or not.
Except for the second step, the whole process consists of easy calculations.
Therefore it implies that the GDDH problem is reduced to SVP on ideal
lattice.
19
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At first when a short element in xgy is given, we describe an cryptanalysis
which is introduced in original GGH paper. Using different κ-products of
level-1 encoding of one y and level-1 encoding of zero x1j’s, one can generate














Here, essential property is two fold. The first one is that the right hand side
of the equation 3.3.1 is not reduced modulo q, because it is a zerotesting
value of level-κ encoding of zero, its size is smaller than q3{4. The second
one is that all of the quantity has the multiple of h. It implies that it is an
element of ideal lattice xhy. Hence, by obtaining these several elements, one
can recover a basis of the ideal lattice xhy.
With a similar arguments, when κ ´ i ´ 1 ě 1, the right hand side is a
multiple of g ¨h and one can recover a basis of the ideal lattice xg ¨hy. Using
the basis of xhy and xg ¨ hy, we can also recover the basis of xgy.
Suppose we have an element of xgy smaller than q1{4. Then any element
of xgy has the form d ¨ g for some d ď q1{4. By multiplying it to zerotesting
parameter, we make a modified zerotesting parameter p1zt “ rd¨g¨h¨z
κ{gsq “
rd ¨ h ¨ zκsq. Here we assume w is a right product of ui. Next we multiply
the modified zerotesting parameter to w and
śκ
i“1 ui, respectively. Because
these are level-κ encodings, it can be written as w “












mod q for some small ci P R. Then we have
following quantities:
rp1zt ¨wsq “ d ¨ h ¨
˜










uisq “ d ¨ h ¨
˜







Since, both of the right hand side are smaller than q1{4 ¨ q1{2 ¨ q1{8 ă
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i“1 uisq “ m0 mod xgy. Because we know the basis of xgy, we can compute
the quantity easily. Finally, we can reduce the value modulo the rotation basis
td ¨ g, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,d ¨ g ¨Xn´1u. This yields a short element m10 and it is a valid level-




smaller than q3{4. If w is not a right product, the above value cannot be small
with overwhelming probability. Hence, one can solve the GDDH problems.
Since the overall attack algorithm consists of only basic arithmetics, the
time complexity of the algorithm heavily relies on finding short vector of xgy.
We now how to find such a short vector in the lattice. Actually, a desired
short element in the ideal lattice can be computed in quasi-polynomial time
in λ, which yields a break of the GGH scheme with the current parameters.
3.3.1 Sublattice Algorithm
Currently, all approximate lattice reduction algorithms have exponentially
large Hermite factors in the rank of the input matrix. For example, LLL has
a Hermite factor 2n{4 for the rank n of input matrix L. To obtain a short
vector with a smaller Hermite factor, we may attempt to apply LLL to a
sublattice of L of smaller dimension. However, it is not always true that a
sublattice of smaller dimension has a determinant smaller than that of the
original lattice L.
In this subsection, we show how to use HNF to obtain a sublattice having
a determinant not larger than that of the original lattice.
Theorem 3.3.1. Given a basis matrix rb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bns of integral lattice L in
Hermite normal form, detprbi, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bnsq ě detprbi`1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bnsq for 1 ď i ď
n´ 1.
Proof. Suppose bi is a vector with pivot di. Consider an ordered basis Bi :“
tbn, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,biu and its corresponding Gram-Schmidt basis tb
˚







}b˚j } “ }b
˚
i } ¨ detpBi`1q. Here b
˚
i is of the form bi ´ pcnbn `
¨ ¨ ¨ ` ci`1bi`1q for some cn, . . . , ci`1 P R and so the first nonzero component
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of b˚i is also di. Hence, }b
˚
i } ě di and detpBiq ě di ¨ detpBi`1q. Since di is a
positive integer by the definition of HNF, we have detpBiq ě detpBi`1q.
An Algorithm for SVP
We apply the LLL algorithm to a sublattice L1 of integral lattice L with
detpL1q ď detpLq obtained as in the previous section. It is described in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 LLL with HNF
Input: tb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bnu and m ă n
Output: tv1, . . . ,vmu
1. Compute the HNF basis pb11, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,b
1
nq of pb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,bnq.
2. Set pv1, . . . ,vmq as the output vector of LLL upon input
pb1n´m`1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,b
1
nq
return pv1, . . . ,vmq.
If we take an appropriate m, the first vector of the output of Algorithm
1 is shorter than that of LLL on the original lattice when the determinant
of the lattice is not large.
Theorem 3.3.2. For an n-dimensional integral lattice L with log detpLq ă






, Algorithm 1 outputs an LLL-reduced basis
of a certain sublattice L1 of L with detL1 ď detL in polynomial time in n




Proof. Let tb11, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,b
1







ă n. When Algorithm 1 is applied to L,
the output is merely the output of LLL on the sublattice L1 generated by
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¨ detpL1q1{m ď 2m{4 ¨ detpLq1{m “ 2
?
logpdetpLqq`ε,
where 0 ď ε ď 1{2.
Obviously, v1 P L
1 Ă L, and the running time is upper bounded by the
running time of LLL and HNF.
Another lattice reduction algorithm, the BKZ algorithm with block size







polypn, sizepBqq ¨ CHKZpβq times, where γβ is the Hermite constant of rank β,
sizepBq is the size of largest entries of basis matrix B of L, and CHKZpβq “
2Opβq is the cost of HKZ-reduction in dimension β [HPS11, ADRSD14].
We claim that our algorithm asymptotically outperforms BKZ with block
size β “ polylogpnq for an n-dimensional integral lattice with determinant 2n
δ
for δ ă 2. While the output vector of BKZ with β has a Euclidean norm of at
most 2pn log βq{β`Op1q, Algorithm 1 with BKZ gives a vector of the Euclidean
norm at most 2n
δ{2
, which is asymptotically smaller than the previous one.
We remark that when the basis entries of an n-dimensional lattice L are
bounded by 2opnq, we achieve a subquadratic determinant 2opn
2q of L.
Furthermore, we may plug BKZ in our algorithm (instead of LLL) to
obtain a shorter lattice vector b P L. More precisely, when detL “ βopn
2q, we




2 .The running time is upper bounded by
the running time of the BKZ algorithm with block size β, polypn, sizepBqq ¨
CHKZpβq, and the running time of computing HNF.
As an application of our algorithm, we find a short vector of an ideal
lattice xgy used in GGH scheme. The determinant of the ideal lattice xgy is
equal to detrg, xg, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1gs, which is bounded by }g}n.
Applying the Algorithm 1 with β-block size BKZ , we can have the
following result, a variant of Theorem 3.3.2:
Theorem 3.3.3. Given an element g of R “ Zrxs{xxn ` 1y with }g} ă
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βn{p2βq, one can find an element f P xgy such that }f} ď 2β
?





n log β log }g}
β
¯
in polypn, log }g}q ¨ CHKZpβq running times.
According to previous arguments in Section 3.3 if one finds a short element
d ¨ g in xgy such that }d ¨ g} ď q1{4, the GGH scheme is not secure. Since
a basis of the ideal lattice xgy is easily recovered in polynomial time, we
may apply our Algorithm 1 to find a short element in the lattice xgy and
break the GGH scheme. From the Theorem 3.3.3, we can obtain an element
d ¨ g P xgy satisfying
















which is asymptotically smaller than q1{4 for β “ log2pλq. Hence, it yields
that GDDH problem of the GGH scheme with the current parameters can
be broken in quasi-polynomial time in λ.
3.4 Attack on GGH with top level encodings
of zero
Since some applications such as indistinguishable obfuscation have no low
level encodings of zero, the analysis of the GDDH with low level encoding of
zero is not enough to explain the hardness of GGH scheme. In this section,
we provide an algorithm for the GDDH problem of the GGH scheme only
using top level encodings of zero. More precisely, suppose we have
tn, q, κ, y, txκiu, pzt, u0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,uκ,wu.
If one can find a basis of xgy, by sublattice algorithm one can also recover
a short element d ¨ g P xgy. It leads to generate a low level encoding of zero
by multiplying the short element to level-1 encoding of one y. Hence, as an
attack algorithm suggested in Section 3.3, one can solve the GDDH problems.
Now we propose an idea to obtain a basis of xgy. Considering ruκ1{xκ1sq “
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ă n4κ and n3.5, which are very smaller than modulus q. In other
words, it is written by ratio of small polynomial in ring Rq. If we recover the
denominator and numerator, one can obtain the multilple of g. By repeating
the procedure, it gives several multiples of g and a basis of g. This means
that GDDH is reduced to the NTRU problem because it is precisely the
NTRU problem of finding elements from small ratio. Especially, the size of q
is exponential of λ, it corresponds to ONTRU problem.
3.4.1 Overstretched NTRU Problem and Its Analysis
In this section, we now explain the formal definition of NTRU problem and
how to solve it using lattcie reduction algorithms. First of all, we state an
NTRU problem as follows:
Definition 3.4.1 (The NTRU problem).
Let n and q be integers, M be a positive real number and F pXq be a degree
n integral polynomial. For a polynomial ring R :“ ZrXs{xF pXqy, f and g
are sampled from R and have Euclidean norms bounded by M . For given a
polynomial h “ rf{gsq, the NTRU problem NTRUR,q,M,τ is to find a ¨ f , a ¨ g P
R for some a P R, such that }a ¨ f}, }a ¨ g} ď τ .
In many NTRU-based applications, M is taken to be similar to polypnq.
Furthermore, when q is set to be super-polynomial in n, the NTRU problem
is called the overstretched NTRU problem (ONTRU). In [ABD16, KF17],
the authors solved ONTRU problem on R “ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y for a power
of two n with τ “ q. In this paper we focus on the ONTRU problem on
R “ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y with τ “ q{2 and M “ polypnq.
Lattice Based Algorithms for NTRU
Now, we state an useful lemma to solve the NTRU problem.
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Lemma 3.4.1 ([GGH13a], Lemma 3). Let f ,g P R “ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y











, then c and rc ¨ f ¨ g´1sq are
contained in the ideal xgy and xfy, respectively.
Proof. Let w :“ rc ¨ f ¨g´1sq. Then, rgwsq “ rcf sq. Since }w} ă q{p2}g} ¨
?
nq,
we have }gw} ď }g}¨}w}¨
?
n ď q{2 and }cf} ď }c}¨}f}¨
?
n ď q{2. Therefore,
gw “ cf in ZrXs{xXn ` 1y. Because cf P xgy and f is a relative prime to g,
we can conclude c P xgy. With similar reasons, we have w P xfy.
Hence, Lemma 3.4.1 gives if one can find a short pair prc ¨ hsq, cq with









By employing the above property, we can describe the basic lattice-based
approach to solve the NTRU problem with an input polynomial h “ rf{gsq.
Let consider the lattice L generated by following 2nˆ 2n basis matrix:
B “
˜


















ci ¨ Bn`i, where Bn`i is the
n ` i-th column vector of the basis matrix B. It implies that prc ¨ hsq, cq is
also identified to lattice point of LpBq. Hence, finding a short pair prc ¨hsq, cq
is the same as finding a short lattice point of LpBq.
We also state another lemma to solve NTRU problems. This is applicable
to the pair pa,bq where b is known to be a multiple of g.
Lemma 3.4.2. Let g be an element of R “ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y and f P R
be relative prime to g. For some d P R, if d ¨ g P xgy Ă R satisfies }d ¨
g} ă
q
2 ¨ n ¨ }f} ¨ }g´1}
then d ¨ g and rd ¨ g ¨hsq are solution of NTRUR,q,M, q
2
problem with input h.
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Proof. By conditions, we have
}d ¨ f} “ }d ¨ f ¨ g´1 ¨ g} ď C2F}d ¨ g} ¨ }f} ¨ }g
´1
} ă q{2.
Hence, rd ¨ g ¨ hsq has the form d ¨ f .
Subfield Algorithm
Generally, the dimension is too large to solve the NTRU problem by using
a lattice reduction algorithm. Therefore we focus on redcuing the dimension
of the NTRU problems. As one of the methods, we discuss how the NTRU
problem with a given input rf{gsq is reduced to the NTRU problem with an
input whose denominator and numerator have half of the degree of f and
g using a subfield technique. Concurrently and independently, in [ABD16],
the authors introduced the this technique using a Norm map. Instaed of the
Norm maps, we exploit the Trace map. In our work, we can achieve the same,
but slightly better, results by using the trace map.
Throughout this section, let n “ 2s and denote QrX2ts{xXn ` 1y and
ZrX2ts{xXn ` 1y by Kt and Rt, respectively, with 0 ď t ď s. Note that
Ks :“ Q ď Ks´1 ď ¨ ¨ ¨ ď K0 “ QrXs{xXn ` 1y, where A ď B denotes
that A is a subfield of B. Since K0 is a Galois extension field of K1 with a
degree of 2, GalpK0{K1q is a group of order 2. That is, GalpK0{K1q “ tid, σu,
satisfying σpXq “ ´X; therefore, σ2 “ id, where id is the identity map. For
an element h,g P R Ă K0, the following elements are contained in R1 Ă K1:
TrK0{K1phq “ h` σphq,
NK0{K1phq “ h ¨ σphq,
T rK0{Ktphσpgqq “ hσpgq ` σphqg,
since they are fixed by GalpK0{K1q. Note that these elements have only
n{2 terms, and the last one lies in 2 ¨ R1. Generally, for 0 ă t ď s, K0
is a Galois extension field of Kt with a degree of 2
t and the Galois group
27
CHAPTER 3. MULTILINEAR MAPS OVER THE IDEAL LATTICES
AND ITS ANALYSIS
Gt :“ GalpK0{Ktq “ tσ0 “ id, σ1, . . . , σ2t´1u. For an element h,g P R Ă K0,








σiphq “ h ¨ σ1phq ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ σ2t´1phq,
T rK0{Ktphσ1pgqσ2pgq ¨ ¨ ¨σ2t´1pgqq,
since they are fixed by GalpK0{Ktq. Moreover, these elements have only n{2
t
terms, and the last one lies in 2t ¨Rt. Using this property, we can obtain the
following main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let q and m P Z be integers and let D and N be positive








u. Then, for FnpXq “ X
n ` 1 with
n “ 2s and 0 ă t ď s, we can reduce NTRUFn,q,D,N,B to NTRUFn{2t ,q,Dt,Nt,Bt,



























Proof. Suppose we are given rf{gsq, where g and f are sampled from the set
















































CHAPTER 3. MULTILINEAR MAPS OVER THE IDEAL LATTICES
AND ITS ANALYSIS
its denominator polynomial, and its numerator polynomial by ht, DPt, and
NPt, respectively. Then it satisfies


























Therefore, we get a new instance ht for NTRUFn{2t ,q,Dt,Nt,Bt from an original

























u. Now, suppose that a solution pat,btq P Rt of
NTRUφn{2t ,q,Dt,Nt,Bt is known such that
rbt{atsq “ ht.
Moreover, since g and f are relative primes with a high probability [ABD16],
we assume the coprimality of g and f . Then, by Lemma 3.4.1, at is of the
form at “ d ¨DPt “ d ¨
ś2t´1
i“0 σipgq. After computing


























. Then, we can conclude that the pair
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ď }at} ¨ }g
´1




















is actually b “
df
ś2t´1
i“1 σipgq in R. Thus, we obtain the desired result.
Comparing with [ABD16], our result works better when N ě D because
the value of our N1 is smaller than that of [ABD16] while the values of D1 are
same. By Theorem 3.4.1, one can solve the ONTRU problem with smaller
dimension and obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let q be an integer, n a power of 2, and λ the security
parameter. Let h “ rf{gsq be an instance of the NTRUφn,q,D,N,B problem with
the parameters log q “ c1 ¨λ
`, n ď c2 ¨λ
2`, N “ qa, 0 ă a ă 1{2, D “ λk ă N ,
φnpXq “ X















































problem is solved in 2Opβq time.










4 and β “ log2 λ, the problem
is solved in 2Oplog
2 λq time. ˚
˚If h and g are sampled from continuous spherical Gaussian distributions, we can obtain
a bound of }g´1} with a high probability. [ABD16, Lemma 3]
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For example, when n “ λ2, D “ λ2, N “ q1{8, and log q “ λ, one can
solve NTRUφn,q,D,N,B in quasi-polynomial time in λ.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4.1, one can obtain a new instance rTrK{Ktprf{gsqq{2
tsq P





O q ¨ Int
¸
,
where Int is the identity matrix with a size nt “ n{2
t, and φtphtq P Zntˆnt is
a matrix whose i-th column is ιpX i2
t
rTrK{Ktprf{gsq{2
tsqqq for 0 ď i ă n{2
t.






j2t , the i-th column of
φtphtq is of the form p´hnt´i, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,´hnt´1, h0, ¨ ¨ ¨hnt´i´1q
T . Using the BKZ
algorithm with a block size β, one can obtain an element in Bt,
ut “ pu0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , unt´1, unt , ¨ ¨ ¨ , u2nt´1q
T ,





























q ď Bt, (3.4.2)
then }c} and }rc ¨ TrK{Ktprf{gsqqsq} satisfy
























In other words, c satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.4.1. Therefore, c is
in xNK{Ktpgqy Ă xgy. Note that c is of the form c “ d ¨NK{Ktpgq “ d
1g P Rt
for some d, d1 P R. Hence, by Theorem 1, a pair pc, rc ¨ hsqq is a solution of
NTRUφn,q,N,D,B. The running time of this procedure is dominated by that of
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the BKZ algorithm with a block size β, which is polypn, log qq ¨CHKZpβq time,
where CHKZpβq “ 2Opβq is the cost of the HKZ reduction in the dimension
















. To check that the above condition for β and t is satisfied, we

































2kpβ ´ 1q log λ
_
.














2t ¨ 2pβ ´ 1q
log β ` 2t log λk `Op1q
« 2
d
n log β log λk
2pβ ´ 1q
`Op1q,
where the last approximation originates from the arithmetic–geometric mean.
This implies that if one chooses β “ log2 λ, then the last value is asymptoti-
cally smaller than p1{2´ aqlog q. Hence, one can obtain the results.
Hybrid Algorithm
In this section, we describe an improved algorithm to solve the ONTRU
problems upon h “ rf{gsq. We also denote Kt “ QrX2
t
s{xXn ` 1y, Rt “
ZrX2ts{xXn ` 1y, and nt “ n{2t as in subfield algorithm.
The subfield attack [ABD16, CJL16] uses only one polynomial NK{Ktphq
or TrK{Ktphq. Instead, we use several polynomials rather than a single one.
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Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.3. Let n be a power of two and g an element of R “ ZrXs{xXn`
1y with square free algebraic norm and f P R a relatively prime to g. When
the sizes of M and }g´1}K are polypnq, and q is super-polynomial in n, one
can solve the NTRUR,q,M,q{2 problems upon rf{gsq using the BKZ algorithm







in polypnq ¨ 2Opβq
time.
Generally, it is expected that it would be easier to recover g, if several
NTRU instances hi “ rfi{gsq are given instead of one element. Unfortunately,
there is no algorithm that uses multiple instances to the best of our knowl-
edge.
When an ONTRU instance rf{gsq with square free norm Npgq is given,
we provide a new algorithm that employs several polynomials in the form of
Trph ¨X´iq. More precisely, we prove that if there exist polynomials ci P Rt













is a multiple of g.: The proof reduces the NTRU problem to finding a short
vector in an appropriate lattice. By applying a sublattice algorithm, we can
get the above theorem.




















j. Our strategy is to
use several polynomials µ0,tphq, µ1,tphq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µm´1,tphq rather than a single
one. From now on, we use µj instead of µj,t for simplicity. Then, we can have
the following lemma, extended from Lemma 3.4.1.
Lemma 3.4.1. Let q be an integer and n be a power of two and nt “ n{2
t,
f ,g P R “ ZrXs{xXn ` 1y and g has a square free norm NK{Qpgq, h “
rf{gsq P Rq. If ci P Rt “ ZrX2
t
s{xXn ` 1y for 0 ď i ă 2t satisfies the
:In particular if ci is equal to zero for 1 ď i ď nt ´ 1 , it is an original subfield attack.
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2t`1 ¨ C3F ¨ }f} ¨ }g
´1}K ¨ }g}2





























´i is contained in the ideal xgy , and the pair pc, rc ¨ f ¨
g´1sqq is a solution of NTRUR,q,M,q{2.
Proof. Throughout in this proof, we write Trpaq and Npaq instead of TrK{Ktpaq
and NK{Ktpaq. and define h̃ “ f ¨ g








. Since Npgq P Rt, we get Npgq ¨ µiph̃q “ Npgq ¨ Trph̃ ¨



















By two conditions of lemma, we have
1. }Npgq ¨w} ď CF ¨ }Npgq} ¨ }w} ď CF ¨ }g}












































ci ¨Trph̃ ¨Npgq ¨X
´iq{2t
34
CHAPTER 3. MULTILINEAR MAPS OVER THE IDEAL LATTICES
AND ITS ANALYSIS
in Rt. It is rewritten as














q ¨ f ¨ Npgq{g.
Because the left hand side of the equation is a multiple of g and f ¨Npgq{g is























2C2F ¨ }f} ¨ }g
´1}K









i so that we











q ¨ Int φtpµ0phqq φtpµ1phqq ¨ ¨ ¨ φtpµ2t´1phqq
0 Int 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0

















where φtpµiphqq is a basis matrix corresponding to the ideal lattice xµiphqy
over ZrXnts{xXn ` 1y. Suppose that one can find a lattice point
b “ pb1||b0|| ¨ ¨ ¨ ||b2t´1q P LpB̂tq
such that }b} ď
q
2t`1 ¨C3F ¨ }f} ¨ }g
´1}K ¨ }g}2
t . Then, trivially, }bi} ď }b}
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“ }b1} ď }b}. Hence, the short vector of LppBtq
guarantee to find a vector satisfying the condition of Lemma 3.4.1.
To find a short lattice point, we apply the lattice reduction algorithms Aδ
to a sublattice L1 generated by the first nt `m column vector of the matrix





2t`1 ¨ C3F ¨ }f} ¨ }g
´1}K ¨ }g}2
t ,
we can find a lattice point b as we want.
Finally, in order to achieve the optimizing condition, one can get the fol-
lowing inequality by taking the logarithm function on both side. Therefore
we have the following asymptotic inequality:






log q ď log q ` oplog nq,
The equation means that log δ ď log
2 q
27n logM
is the condition of δ to solve the
NTRU problem. Hence, we can solve NTRUR,q,M, q
2
in polypnq ¨ 2Opβq time if







, using the BKZ algorithm with block size
β.
Application to GGH: Finding a lattice point of xgy
Now we explain how to use the Theorem 3.4.3 in order to recover a ba-
sis of xgy. Suppose we have top level encodings of zerotxκi “ rbκig{z
κsq










n ď n3.5 with overwhelming probability. For conve-
nience, we use the notation Gt to denote GalpK{Ktq. Considering ru
κ
1{xκ1sq “





ă n4κ and n3.5, respectively. Using the algorithm in Theo-
rem 3.4.3 for several rm1I{bκjgsq :“ rm
1
i1 ¨ ¨ ¨m
1
iκ{bκjgsq for I “ ri1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , iκs,
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We remark that AI,j is in RzRt because AI,j is not fixed for any subgroup of






1q “ δpm1IcIq ¨
ś
σPGtztδu
σpbκj ¨ gq P xgy for δ P Gtztidu.
One can easily see that tδpAI,jquδPGtztidu only have a common factor g. There-
fore, using tδpAI,jquδPGtztidu, we recover a basis matrix of the ideal lattice of
xgy. Using NK{Ktpaq for a P xgy, which is a multiple of NK{Ktpgq, one can
also recover a basis matrix of the ideal lattice of xNK{Ktpgqy. Now, using the
sublattice algorithm with β block-BKZ algorithm, one can obtain an element






In summary, we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.3.1. Given tn, q, κ, txκiu, pzt, u0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,uκ,wu of the GDDH
instances, where n is Θpλ2q, log q “ Θpλq, xκi is a level-κ encoding of zero,
ui is a level-1 encoding of mi, and w is a challenge element, one can solve
the GDDH in the GGH scheme in 2Oplog
2 λq.
According to this Corollary, using the parameters suggested by [GGH13a]
leads to attack a security ground of this scheme in the quasi-polynomial time
of its security parameter. Thus, n must be at least Ωpλ3q when log q “ Θpλq
with the security parameter λ to avoid our attack.
Remark. We assume that the size of the numerator is small for the top
level encoding of zero, but in practice this assumption may not be valid for
applications. That is, the size of the numerator of the top level encoding of
zero is very large, and the GDDH problem in this case is still a hard problem.
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Multilinear Maps over the
Integers and Its Analysis
In this chapter, we introduce CLT multilinear maps and its analysis. The
CLT scheme are provided relying over the integers and Chinese remainder
theorem (CRT). In other words, all elements of CLT are provided in the form
of CRT. In this chapter, for n primes p1, . . . , pn we use a notation to express
the CRT form
CRTpp1,...,pnqpr1, . . . , rnq or CRTppiqpriq,









pi{2s. By CRT, it is uniquely determined.
Basically, its underlying set of CLT is a Zn. Let gi P Z 1 ď i ď n be
small integers and pi, 1 ď i ď n, large integers. Then a message space and a








pi ¨ Zy, respectively.
Because also the CLT schme is constructed by a graded encoding scheme,
it provide a zero-testing parameter and its encodings are defined with level.
A difference with GGH scheme is that CLT provides n zerotesting param-
eters in order to sure the zerotesting process in CLT work properly. How-
ever, some applications give up on that guarantee and provide only one
zerotesting parameter. For that reason, this thesis suggests an analysis us-
ing only one zerotesting parameter. In CLT scheme, the level-t encoding of
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m “ pm1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,mnq P Zn and zerotesting parameter are of the form:
enctpmq “














where ri is a small random integer and z, h are fixed secret integers. If one
can recover a secret pi, the CLT scheme with public data is reduced to GGH
scheme over integer. With a similar argument described in Section 3.3, one
can recover xhiy and xgiy over Z so hi and gi are also recovered. Indepen-
dently from enctpm1q{enctpm2q “ pri1 ¨ gi `mi1q{pri2 ¨ gi `mi2q mod pi, one
can obtain the its denominator and numerator. Then its modulus reduction
with gi reveals the secret message. It means that to find pi leads to break the
CLT scheme. Hence, we focus on finding a prime pi.
4.1 The CLT13 Multilinear Map.
First, we briefly recall the Coron et al. construction. We refer to the original
paper [CLT13] for a complete description. The scheme relies on the following
parameters.
λ: the security parameter
κ: the multilinearity parameter
ρ: the bit length of the randomness used for encodings
α: the bit length of the message slots
η: the bit length of the secret primes pi
n: the number of distinct secret primes
τ : the number of level-1 encodings of zero in public parameters
`: the number of level-0 encodings in public parameters
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ν: the bit length of the image of the multilinear map
β: the bit length of the entries of the zero-test matrix H
Instance generation: pparams,pztq Ð InstGenp1
λ, 1κq. Set the scheme pa-
rameters as explained above. For i P rns, generate η-bit primes pi, α-bit
primes gi, and compute x0 “
ś
iPrns pi. Sample z Ð Zx0 . Let Π “ pπijq P Znˆn
with πij Ð pn2
ρ, pn ` 1q2ρq X Z if i “ j, otherwise πij Ð p´2ρ, 2ρq X Z. For
i P rns, generate ~ri P Zn by choosing randomly and independently in the
half-open parallelepiped spanned by the columns of the matrix Π and denote
by rij the j-th component of ~ri. Generate H “ phijq P Znˆn,A “ paijq P Znˆ`
such that H is invertible and }HT }8 ď 2
β, }pH´1qT }8 ď 2
β and for i P rns,


































for j P rns,
where ri Ð p´2
ρ, 2ρq X Z and r1ij Ð p´2ρ, 2ρq X Z. Output params “
pn, η, α, ρ, β, τ, `, ν, x0, y, txju, tx
1
ju, tΠju, sq and pzt. Here s is a seed for a
strong randomness extractor, which is used for an “Extraction” procedure.
We do not recall the latter as it is not needed to describe our attack.
Re-randomizing level-1 encodings: c1 Ð reRandpparams, cq. For j P
rτ s, i P rns, sample bj Ð t0, 1u, b
1
i Ð r0, 2
µq XZ, with µ “ ρ` α` λ. Return
c1 “ rc`
ř




i ¨ Πisx0 . Note that this is the only procedure
in the CLT multilinear map that uses the xj’s.
˚
˚This procedure can be adapted to higher levels 1 ă k ď κ by publishing appropriate
quantities in params.
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Adding and multiplying encodings: Given two encodings c1 and c2 of
the same level, the sum of c1 and c2 is computed by Add(c1, c2)=rc1` c2sx0 .
Given two encodings c1 and c2, we multiply c1 and c2 by Mul(c1, c2)=rc1 ¨
c2sx0 .
Zero-testing: isZeropparams, pzt, uκq
?
“ 0{1. Given a level-κ encoding c,
return 1 if }rpzt ¨ csx0}8 ă x0 ¨ 2
´ν , and return 0 otherwise.
Coron et al. also described a variant where only one such ppztqj is given
out, rather than n of them (see [CLT13, Se. 6]) and some applications are use
the variant. Since, our attack requires only one ppztqj, without loss of gen-
erality, we denote one zerotesting parameter as pzt without index notation.
In [GLW14, App. B.3], Gentry et al. described a variant of the above con-
struction that aims at generalizing asymmetric cryptographic bilinear maps.
Our attack can be adapted to that variant.
Hardness Assumptions
Instead of recalling the definitions of the GDDH problem of the CLT scheme.
We introduce the more difficult problem we are trying to solve. For given
the inputs params “ pn, η, α, ρ, β, τ, `, ν, x0, y, txju, tx
1
ju, tΠju, sq and pzt, the
hardness problem is to output a prime factor of
Parameter Settings.
Coron et al. suggested to set the parameters so that the following conditions
are met:
‚ ρ “ Ωpλq: to avoid brute force attack (see also [LS14] for a constant
factor improvement).
‚ α “ λ : so that the ring of messages Zg1 ˆ . . .ˆZgn does not contain a
small subring Zgi .:
:In fact, it seems that making the primes gi public, equal, and Ωpκq may not lead to
any specific attack [CLT14b].
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‚ n “ Ωpη ¨ λq: to thwart lattice reduction attacks.
‚ ` ě n¨α`2λ: to be able to apply the leftover hash lemma from [CLT13,
Le. 1].
‚ τ ě n ¨ pρ` log2p2nqq` 2λ: to apply leftover hash lemma from [CLT13,
Se. 4].
‚ β “ Ωpλq: to avoid the so-called gcd attack.
‚ η ě ρκ ` α ` 2β ` λ ` 8, where ρκ is the maximum bit size of the
random ri’s a level-κ encoding. When computing the product of κ level-
1 encodings and an additional level-0 encoding, one obtains ρκ “ κ ¨
p2α ` 2ρ` λ` 2 log2 n` 2q ` ρ` log2 `` 1.
‚ ν “ η ´ β ´ ρf ´ λ´ 3: to ensure zero-test correctness.
4.2 CRT-ACD with auxiliary input and Its
Analysis
In this section, we introduce a CRT-ACD problem with auxiliary input and
analyze the problem. Next by adapting the analysis of CRT-ACD with auxil-
iary input to CLT multilinear maps, we describe to find pi from params and
zerotesting parameter of the CLT scheme.
The approximate greatest common divisor problem (ACD) is initially in-
troduced by Howgrave-Graham [HG01]. It is a problem to find a secret prime
p given many near-multiples of p. One of the promising applications of this
problem is a homomorphic encryption scheme [vDGHV10]. The scheme has
superiority in regard to conceptual simplicity compared to other homomor-
phic encryption schemes based on lattice problems.
The ACD problem is naturally extended by using multiple primes rather
than a single one. An instance of the problem is an integer of the form
piqi ` ri for each prime pi. Therefore, it can be defined by using Chinese
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Remainder Theorem (CRT). Now we give a precise definition of an extended
ACD problem, which is called CRT-ACD problem.
Definition 4.2.1. (CRT-ACD) Let n, η, ε P N, and χε be a distribution over
Z X p´2ε, 2εq. For given η bit primes p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn, the sampleable CRT-ACD
distribution Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq is defined as
Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq “ tCRTppiqpriq | ri Ð χεu.





pi, find pi for all i.
Cheon et al. gave a batch homomorphic encryption [CCK`13] based on
a stronger variant of CRT-ACD problems, where the size of p1 is larger than
other pi’s and they take r1 from uniform distribution over Zp1 . In that case,
it can be reduced to the original ACD problem.
For proper parameters, the CRT-ACD problems are regarded to be hard.
In this section, however, we show that when the auxiliary input CRTppiqpx0{piq
is given, the CRT-ACD is solved in polynomial-time of n, η, ε. Now we define
a variant of CRT-ACD, as CRT-ACD problem with auxiliary input.
Definition 4.2.2. (CRT-ACDwAI) Let n, η, ε P N, and χε be a distribution
over Z X p´2ε, 2εq. For given η bit primes p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn, define x0 “
śn
i“1 pi
and p̂i “ x0{pi, for 1 ď i ď n. The sampleable CRT-ACD distribution
Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq is defined as
Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq “ tCRTppiqpriq | ri Ð χεu.
The CRT-ACDwAI is: For given many samples from Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq, x0
and P̂ “ CRTppiqpp̂iq, to find pi for all i.
The auxiliary input P̂ has a special feature which can be written as a
summation of its CRT components in Zx0 . A key observation is that the
equation holds over the integers when log n` 1 ă η. Using this property, we
obtain a following lemma.
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pi, and a “ CRTppiqpriq Ð
Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq, it satisfies:





if ε` log n` 1 ă η.
Proof. The first equality is correct by the definition of Chinese remainder
theorem. To show that the second equality is correct, we consider the equation
modulo pi for each i. Then the left hand side is ri ¨ p̂i and the right hand side




ri ¨ p̂i is
smaller than n ¨ 2ε ¨ 2pn´1q¨η which is less than x0{2. Hence, by the uniqueness
of CRT, the second equality holds.
This lemma transforms the modulus equation to an integer equation of
r1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , rn with unknown coefficients p̂1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , p̂n. Our goal is to recover ri
by using the integral equation.
Now we describe full details of solving the CRT-ACDwAI.
Constructing Matrix Equations over Z
Now we show how to compute p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn when given polynomially many
samples of the CRT-ACD from Dχε,η,npp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnq with ε` log n` 1 ă η and
the auxiliary input P̂ “ CRTppiqpp̂iq. For given two instances of CRT-ACD
a “ CRTppiqpaiq and b “ CRTppiqpbiq, abP̂ mod x0 “
ř
aibip̂i mod x0. If all of
ai’s and bi’s are small enough, the right hand side equals to
ř
aibip̂i, and so
it can be written as the following matrix equation over the integers:
abP̂ mod x0 “
´









p̂1 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 p̂2 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 0
. . . 0
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The matrix representations share the diagonal matrix diagpp̂1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , p̂nq for
any CRT-ACD instances a and b. Hence, we can construct an pnˆ nq-matrix
which is a multiple of diagpp̂1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , p̂nq by arranging abP̂ mod x0 for various
a and b.
More precisely, we are given 2n` 1 number of samples from the distribu-
tion Dχε,η,n as following:
ai “ CRTppkqpak,iq, b “ CRTppkqpbkq, cj “ CRTppkqpck,jq for 1 ď i, j ď n.
To adapt Lemma 4.2.2 to aibcj mod x0, we assume that the parameters
of the problem satisfy the condition: 3ε ` log n ` 1 ă η. Then compute the
following values by multiplying the samples:




ak,i ¨ bkp̂k ¨ ck,j for 1 ď i, j ď n,




ak,i ¨ p̂k ¨ ck.j for 1 ď i, j ď n.





ai ¨ p̂ibi ¨ ci “
´









b1p̂1 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 b2p̂2 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 0
... 0






























ai ¨ p̂i ¨ ci “
´









p̂1 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 p̂2 ¨ ¨ ¨ 0
0 0
... 0


























By collecting these values, we can construct two matrices W “ pwi,jq and
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W1 “ pw1i,jq PMnˆnpZq, which can be written as
W “ AT ¨ diagpb1p̂1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , bnp̂nq ¨C,
W1 “ AT ¨ diagpp̂1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , p̂nq ¨C
for AT “ pak,iq and C “ pck,jq PMnˆnpZq.
Disclosing all the Secret Quantities
Suppose A and C are invertible matrices over Q. We compute pW1q´1 over
Q and the following matrix:




Here the eigenvalues of the matrix V are exactly the set B “ tb1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , bnu.
The set B can be computed in polynomial-time of η, n, and ε from V
(e.g., by factoring the characteristic polynomial over Z). The prime pi is a
common factor of both pb ´ biq and x0, and they have other common factor
if and only if bj “ bi for some j P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu. Hence if bi’s are distinct , we
can get all secret integers p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn.
tGCDpb´ β, x0q | β P Bu “ tpi | 1 ď i ď nu.
Remark. The probability prob1 that matrix A and C are invertible matrices
depends on the distribution χε. The probability prob2 that bi ‰ bj for all
1 ď i ă j ď n also depends on the distribution χε. Our attack succeeds with
probability of prob1 ¨prob2. For example, this probability is overwhelming with
respect to ε when χε is uniform distribution over p´2
ε, 2εq. Since our attack
consists of a matrix multiplication, computing a characteristic polynomial
and finding roots of the polynomial, the overall cost is bounded by rOpn2`ω ¨ηq,
with ω ď 2.38. Hence, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 4.2.1. Let Uε be the uniform distribution over p´2
ε, 2εqXZ. When
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pi, and P̂ “ CRTppiqpp̂iq, one can recover every secret primes
p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn in time rOpn2`ω ¨ ηq with ω ď 2.38 and overwhelming probability to
ε.
4.2.1 Application to CLT Schemes
In this section, we adapt the analysis of CRT-ACD with auxiliary input to
CLT multilinear maps. The instances params and pzt of the problem and
the CLT multilinear map are quite similar. The encodings of CLT resemble
the instances of the problem except the secret constant z. The zero-testing
parameters pzt also has a similar structure with P̂ but contains coefficients
with large size about pi. However, when we restrict zero-testing to encodings
of 0, it behaves similar to Lemma 4.2.2.
More precisely, let a be a top-level encoding of 0 and can be written by
a “ CRTppiqprigi{z
κq. Hereafter since we use only one zero-testing parameter,
without loss of generality, we denote ppztq1 as pzt. As similar in Lemma 4.2.2,





as long as the last quantity is smaller than x0{2. By zero-testing conditions,
it is always true for valid top level encodings of zero. Next, by replacing a by
valid κ level encodings of zero x1j ¨x
1
1 ¨xk ¨ y
k´1 or x1j ¨xk ¨ y
k´1 for 1 ď j, k ď n
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1 ¨ xk ¨ y
κ´1




p̂i ¨ hi ¨ x
1
ij ¨ prigi ` 1q
κ´1









i ¨ rik, and
w1jk “ x
1
j ¨ xk ¨ y
κ´1




p̂i ¨ hi ¨ x
1










where h1i “ p̂i ¨ hi ¨ prigi ` 1q
κ´1. By spanning 1 ď i, j ď n, we obtain the
matrix W and W1:
W “ X1T ¨ diagpx111 ¨ h
1





W1 “ X1T ¨ diagph11, ¨ ¨ ¨ , h
1
nq ¨R,
for X1T “ px1ijq and R “ prikq. By applying the same method in the section
2, we can recover tx11, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn1u by computing the eigenvalues of W ¨W
1´1.
Hence we can compute all secret pi by computing GCDpx
1
1 ´ xi1, x0q.
Consequently, we need W1 and W to be invertible. We argue that this
is the case here. We prove it for W. Note first that the x1i1’s and the h
1
i’s
are all non-zero, with overwhelming probability. Note that by design, the
matrix prijqiPrns,jPrτ s has rank n (see [CLT13, Section. 4]). The same holds
for the matrix px1ijqiPrns,jPr`s (see [CLT13, Lemma. 1]). As we can compute
the rank of a W P Ztˆt obtained by using an X1 P Ztˆn and an R P Znˆt
obtained by respectively using a t-subset of the x1j’s and a t-subset of the xj’s.
Without loss of generality we may assume that our X1,R P Znˆn are non-
singular. The cost of finding such a pair pX1,Rq is bounded as rOppτ ` `q ¨
pnω log x0qq “ rOpκω`3λ2ω`6q, with ω ď 2.38 (assuming all parameters are
set smallest possible so that the bounds of parameter setting hold). Here
we used the fact that the rank of a matrix A P Znˆn may be computed
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in time rOpnω log }A}8q (see [Sto09]). This dominates the overall cost of the
attack.
After we know all the pi’s, we have xj{y “ rijgi{prigi ` 1q mod pi. As
the numerator and denominator are coprime and very small compared to pi,
they can be recovered by the rational reconstruction algorithm. We hence
obtain prijgiq’s for all j. The gcd of all the prijgiq’s reveals gi. As a result,
we can also recover all the rij’s and ri’s. As x1 “ ri1gi{z mod pi and the
numerator is known, we can recover z mod pi for all i, and hence z mod x0.
The hij’s can then be recovered as well, so can the r
1
ij’s and aij’s.
Related and Follow-up Works. Our attack was extended in [BWZ14,
GHMS14, CGH`15] to settings in which no low-level encoding of 0 are avail-
able. The extensions rely on low-level encodings of elements corresponding
to orthogonal vectors and impact [GLW14, GLSW15, GGH`13b].
After our attack was published in Eurocrypt’15, the draft [GGHZ14] was
update to propose a candidate immunization against our attack (see [GGHZ14,
Se. 6]).; Another candidate immunization was proposed in [BWZ14]. Both
immunizations have proved insecure in [CLT14a]. See also [CGH`15].
A further modification of CLT was proposed by Coron, Lepoint and Ti-
bouchi in the proceedings of CRYPTO’15 [CLT15]. They claimed that our
attack is thwarted since the modified scheme keeps the modulus secret so
that the zero-testing procedure depends on the CRT components in a non-
linear way. However, it turned out to be insecure as proved by Cheon et al.
in [CFL`16] who exploit an extension of eigenvalues and determinant tech-
niques as in Section 4.2 and 4.3.
Remark. In case of the obfuscation on CLT multilinear map, the security
remained open problems because the applications is not given an encodings
of zero. Recently, Coron et al. provide a new result [CLLT16] about it, which
enables one to break the obfuscation on CLT multilinear map in polynomial-
;The former version that was impacted by our attack can still be accessed from the
IACR eprint server.
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time.
4.3 Analysis of the Related Problems.
In this section, we provide an analysis of the SubM, DLIN, and GXDH prob-
lems associated with the CLT multilinear map. We start by defining these
problems adapted to CLT version. We then describe how to solve these prob-
lems in polynomial-time. Briefly,these problems are unified by the problem
of determining whether a given matrix is full rank or not. The only difference
is the dimension of a given matrix. SubM is given rank n, L-DLIN is Ln, and
GXDH is 2n. Therefore, the attack algorithm of these problems is the same
process.
The attack procedure consists of two steps. First, in Section 4.3, we show
how to recover
ś
i gi. Next, in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, we use that quantity
to recognize valid instances of the SubM and DLIN. In Section 4.3.3, we
introduce a method to solve the GXDH.
Let G “ Zg1 ˆ . . .ˆ Zgn and Gi be the subgroup of order gi obtained by
making the components of the other Zgj ’s to be zero. For index set I Ď rns,
we denote GI “
ś
iPI Gi. We let enc1pmq denote a properly generated level-1
encoding of m P G. For integers L,N ą 0, we let RkipZLˆLN q denote the set
of L ˆ L matrices over ZN of rank i. If N is a product of primes, we define
the rank of a matrix as the maximum of the ranks of the matrices obtained
by reduction modulo all the prime divisors of N .
Definition 4.3.1. (The Subgroup Membership Problem) SubM is as
follows. Given λ and κ, generate params and pzt using InstGen and tenc1pgiq :
i P r`su where the gi’s are uniformly and independently sampled in a strict
subgroup GI of G, with ` sufficiently large so that the gi’s generate GI with
overwhelming probability. Given params, pzt, tenc1pgiq : i P r`su and u “
enc1pmq, determine whether m is sampled uniformly in GI or in G.
Definition 4.3.2. (L-Decisional Linear Problem) L-DLIN is as follows.
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In one of the constructions of [ABP15], the authors rely on the following
particular case. The problem is as follows. The algorithm is given params and
pzt as well as tenc1paiquiPrLs and tenc1paibiquiPrLs for some uniform and inde-
pendent a1, . . . , aL, b1, . . . , bL P G. It is also given enc1pmq, and it has to assess
whether m is uniformly and independently sampled in G or whether m “
b1 ` . . . ` bL. This can be restated as a special case of Definition 4.3.2, by










a1b1 a1 0 . . . 0
a2b2 0 a2 . . . 0
...
aLbL 0 0 . . . aL










We recall asymmetric multilinear maps and the associated GXDH prob-
lem. By applying the attacks described above, we can solve GXDH in polynomial-
time.
Instance generation: pparams,pztq Ð InstGenp1
λ, 1κq. The setting of the
parameters pi, gi, x0, tx
1
ju,Π and H are as in the original scheme. For 1 ď





















, for 1 ď j ď τ.
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i mod piq ¨
ź
i1‰i
pi1 mod x0, for 1 ď j ď n.





ju, tΠju, sq and pzt.




Since, as same as in section 3.2, we only use one zero-testing parameter, we
denote ppztq1 as pzt. We now define the CLT variant of the GXDH problem.
Definition 4.3.3. (Graded External DDH Problem) GXDH is as fol-
lows. Given λ and κ, generate params and pzt using InstGen. Given params,
pzt and enctpaq, enctpbq and enctpcq with a, b Ð G and for a given t P rκs,
the goal is to decide whether c “ a ¨ b or c is uniformly and independently
sampled in G.












Our main strategy to solve these three related problem of CLT scheme is
that: For a given level-1 encoding









for 1 ď i, j ď t,
we can construct a matrix Wei,j :“ Wi,j as similar to Section 4.2 by com-
puting rx1k ¨ ei,j ¨ xl ¨ y
κ´2 ¨ pztsx0 for 1 ď k, l ď n:
Wi,j “ X
1
¨ pSi,jG`Mi,jq ¨ diagph̃1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , h̃nq ¨R
“ X1 ¨ pSi,jG`Mi,jq ¨R
1,
where h̃i “ hi ¨ prigi ` 1q
κ´2 ¨ p̂i, Si,j “ diagps
pi,jq
1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , s
pi,jq
n q and Mi,j “
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1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,m
pi,jq
n q. By collecting these matrix W “ pWi,jq for 1 ď i, j ď
t, we can get following matrix:





































Related problems are to distinguish problems for given matrix of encoding E,
the size of matrix is different depending on problem. Those related problems
can be seen as following:
SubM: For t “ 1 and a given E, determine mÐ GI or not.
L-DLIN: For t “ L and a given E, determine pmpi,jqqi,j Ð RkL´1pZLˆLN q
or RkLpZLˆLN q.





is a full rank or
not
In case of SubM, determining m “ pmiq1ďiďn is in GI or not is the same as




giq. This value can be computed
from determinant of W and
ś
gi. In case of GXDH and L-DLIN, the deter-
minant of W is a multiple of gi for any i, if the middle term matrix M does
not have a full rank. In other case, the determinant of M is not a multiple of
gi with a high probability. Hence, if one can recover the
ś
gi, one can solve
the related problems.
Remark. The important difference between cryptanalysis of these related
problems and the cryptanalysis of the CLT scheme is the form of the middle
matrix of W. The previous attack in Section 3 is based on the fact that the
middle matrix is a diagonal matrix. For example, in [BWZ14], the authors
fixed the middle matrix into block diagonal matrix form.§ On the other hand,
the attack of related problems in this section does not depend on it.
§Soon after, it is also known to be insecure by Coron et al.’s extended attack
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Suppose we have public instances
params “ pn, η, α, ρ, β, τ, `, ν, x0, y, txju, tx
1
ju, tΠju, sq and pzt.
The main step in the attack is to get
ś
i gi from pparams,pztq. It may be
admissible to assume that the gi’s are public in which computing
ś
i gi is
trivial. If for some reason the gi’s have to stay secret, one must set their bit-
sizes as Ωpλ2q, so that they cannot be recovered by combining the approach
described below with the elliptic curve factorization algorithm.
Similarly to the Section 4.2, we compute wkl :“ rx
1
k ¨ y ¨ xl ¨ y





k ¨ xi ¨ xl ¨ y
κ´2 ¨ pztsx0 and obtain a matrix
Wy “ X
1




¨ diagpri1g1, . . . , ringnq ¨R
1.
We can get a multiple of
ś
i gi by taking a ratio of gcd’s of determinants of
appropriate subsets of tW1, . . . ,Wm,Wyu:
gcdpdet W1, . . . , det Wmq






















for some integer ∆. We expect that ∆ consists of only small factors because
it is a common divisor of many random variables. These variables do not sat-
isfy uniformity condition, because rij is chosen in a half-open parallelepiped
spanned by matrix Π. However the elements of matrix Π are drawn from
some interval that is independent of an arbitrary prime p. Therefore, we may
(heuristically) assume that the smoothness probabilities are the same as that
of the uniform case. Under this assumption, the integer ∆ is 2n-smooth (i.e.,
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all its divisors are ď 2n) with probability ě 0.9, as we explain below. The
more general results can be found in [CK16].
Lemma 4.3.3 (Heuristic). Let rij be a random integer for i P rns, j P rms
with m ě s logp2nq for some positive integer s. Then gcdp
ś
i ri1, . . . ,
ś
i rimq
is 2n-smooth with probability ě ζpsq´1, which is ě 0.9 when s ě 4.
Proof. Our heuristic assumption is that each rij is divisible by a prime p ą 2n
with probabilityď 1{p, for all p’s. First, we observe that for each j, the integer
ś
i rij is divisible by p with probability ď 1 ´ p1 ´ 1{pq
n ď n{p. Then the
probability that gcdp
ś
i ri1, . . . ,
ś
i rimq is divisible by p is ď pn{pq
m. As a






p1´ 1{psq “ ζpsq´1
ź
pď2n
p1´ 1{psq´1 ě ζpsq´1.
Here the first inequality comes from pn{pqm ď pn{2nqm “ p1{2qm ď 1{ps for
m ě s log p. The equality is Euler’s identity for the Riemann zeta function.
The latter is decreasing and ζp4q´1 ą 0.9. This completes the proof.
By Lemma 4.3.3, the integer ∆ is p2nq-smooth with probability ą 0.9.
We eliminate it by trial division by all integers ď 2n. This costs rOpκ2λ5q
bit operations. This is dominated by the cost of the operations described in
Sections 4.2, which is rOpκω`3λ2ω`6q.
4.3.1 Solving the CLT SubM Problem
We compute wkl “ rx
1
k ¨ enc1pmq ¨ xl ¨ y
κ´2 ¨ pztsx0 :
W “ X1 ¨ diagpr1g1 ` x1, . . . , rngn ` xnq ¨R
1,
with xi P Zgi for all i. The attack consists in computing gcdpdet W,
ś
i giq.
If m is uniformly sampled in G, then we expect n{2α of the xi’s to be
zero. Hence, in that case, we have log gcdpdet W,
ś
i giq « αn{2
α. For the
original setting of α “ λ, this is essentially 0.
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If m is uniformly sampled in GI , then all the xi’s for i R I are zero,
and we expect pn ´ |I|q{2α of the others to be zero. Hence, in that case, we
have log gcdpdet W,
ś
i giq « α|I| ` αpn´ |I|q{2
α.
4.3.2 Solving the CLT DLIN Problem
As we have seen, we assume that
ś
i gi is known. In DLIN, we are given a ma-





pk. Using the same method to above, we compute matrices Wi,j P Znˆn for









W11 W12 . . . W1L
W21 W22 . . . W2L
...
. . .









We compute the determinant of W. It satisfies the following equation.








B1,1 B1,2 . . . B1,L
B2,1 B2,2 . . . B2,L
...
. . .

















n q for all i, j. Let ∆ “
detpX1qL ¨ detpR1qL. We have det W “ ∆ ¨
ś





k qi,j and it is congruent to Pk “ pm
pi,jq
k qpi,jq in modulo gk.
To distinguish among the instances of DLIN, we compute det W and
check whether it is divisible by
ś
k gk. If E is sampled from a full rank
matrix, the determinant of Pk is nonzero for some k. Hence det W cannot
be multiple of
ś
k gk. In other case, then det Pi “ 0 for all i. Hence det W is
a multiple of
ś
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4.3.3 Solving the CLT GXDH Problem
In the following, we assume that κ ě 3. Without loss of generality, we assume
that t “ 1 in the GXDH problem. The first step in the attack is to get
ś
i gi
from pparams,pztq. Similar to Section 4.1, we compute Wyp1q and the Wi’s







p4q . . . ypκq ¨ pztsx0qk,l
“ R ¨ diagpr
p1q
1 g1 ` 1, . . . , r
p1q
n gn ` 1q ¨ diagph
1











p4q . . . ypκq ¨ pztsx0qk,l
“ R ¨ diagpr
p1q
i1 g1, . . . , r
p1q
in gnq ¨ diagph
1




where R “ pr
p2q




Similar to Section 4.1, we obtain a multiple of
ś
i gi by taking a ratio of
gcd’s of determinants of appropriate subsets of tW1, . . . ,Wm,Wyp1qu:
gcdpdet W1, . . . , det Wmq





for some integer ∆. For the same reason as before, by Lemma 4.3.3, the
integer ∆ is p2nq-smooth with probability ą 0.9. We eliminate it by trial
division by all integers ď 2n. Thus, we can get
ś
i gi in time
rOpκω`3λ2ω`6q.
Next, we instantiate with yp1q “ enc1paq, enc1pbq, enc1pcq, respectively. We
get:
Wa “ R ¨ diagpr
p1q
a1 g1 ` a1, . . . , r
p1q
an gn ` anq ¨ diagph
1




Wb “ R ¨ diagpr
p1q
b1 g1 ` b1, . . . , r
p1q
bn gn ` bnq ¨ diagph
1




Wc “ R ¨ diagpr
p1q
c1 g1 ` c1, . . . , r
p1q
cn gn ` cnq ¨ diagph
1















ai gi ` aiq ¨ pr
p1q
bi gi ` biq ´ pr
p1q
ci gi ` ciq ¨ pr
p1q
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2. If c is equal to a ¨b, then the quantity
above has
ś
i gi as a large factor. If c is uniformly and independently sampled
in G, then the quantity above is independent from
ś
i gi. The cost of the




In this thesis, we present the analysis of two candidate of multilinear maps
of CLT and GGH.
First, in case of GGH, we have shown that if the low level encodings of
zero exist, the underlying problem is reduced to the SVP on ideal lattice. By
using the sublattice algorithm, we also show that given parameters in GGH
is insecure.
If we have only a top level encoding of zero, we reduce from the under-
lying problem GDDH of the GGH to the ONTRU problem. In this work, we
described how to find a small solution of the variant of the NTRU problem
using a reduction technique. By applying our proposed algorithm, subfield
algorithm, to the GGH scheme, we could attack the GDDH problem in the
GGH scheme. Therefore, our results imply that there is no guarantee for the
security of the GGH scheme when we are given a small encoding of zero and
also when we are not given.
Unfortunately, the current attacks of the GGH scheme can be resist by
increasing the size of dimension n from λ2 to λ3, where λ is a security pa-
rameter. Thus, the natural extension of this research is to increase the range
of possible attack parameters.
Finally, we propose polynomial-time attacks for CRT-ACD with auxiliary
input, the CLT scheme and its related problems. Until now, the CRT-ACD
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is given, we find quadratic equations for secret parameters and construct a
matrix. The matrix has eigenvalues as secret parameters and reveals them by
computing characteristic polynomial of the matrix. Adapting this methods
to the CLT scheme allows us to totally find every secret parameters.
Unfortunately, this analysis is possible only when low level encodings of
zero and zero-testing parameter are given. To date, there is no known how
to analyze the CLT scheme when there is no encoding of zero. Therefore,
natural proceedings of this research is to extend the range of applications of
graded encoding schemes for which the encodings of zero are not needed.
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[CLLT16] Jean-Sébastien Coron, Moon Sung Lee, Tancrède Lepoint, and
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다중선형함수는 암호학에서 강력한 도구 중 하나이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 현재까지
3종류의 다중선형함수만이 제안되었다. Garg 등에 의해 첫 번째로 제안된 다중선형
함수(GGH)는아이디얼격자를이용하여제안되었고, Coron등은정수기반다중선형
함수(CLT)를 제안했다. 마지막으로 Gentry 등에 의해 그래프 기반 다중선형함수가
제안되었다. 다중선형함수의 등장은 여러 암호학적 응용들을 현실화 시키는 계기가
되었다.
이러한 응용들의 안전성은 주어진 다중선형함수로부터 파생된 어려운 문제들에
기반을두어설명이되는데아직까지파생된문제들의안전성은설명되지못하고있는
상황이다. 이로 인해 다중선형함수의 안전성을 설명하기 위한 후속 연구가 꾸준히 진
행되고 있는데, 실제로 GGH 다중선형함수에서 낮은 등급의 0의 인코딩이 주어지는
경우와 세 번째 다중선형함수는 안전하지 않은 것으로 밝혀졌다.
본 학위 논문에서는 GGH와 CLT 다중선형함수의 대수적 구조를 활용하여 다중
선형함수 및 이로부터 파생된 문제를 분석하는 연구를 진행한다.
우선 GGH 다중선형함수에서 낮은 등급의 0의 인코딩이 주어지는 경우, 주어진
아이디얼 격자에서 빠른 시간 안에 짧은 길이의 벡터를 찾는 연구를 진행하여 기존에
알려진 GGH 다중선형함수와 다른 공격 알고리즘을 제안하고, 그 결과 GGH 다중선
형함수가 안전하지 않음을 보인다.
두 번째로 낮은 등급의 0의 인코딩이 없는 경우에는, 주어진 GGH의 공개 데이터
로부터 낮은 등급의 0의 인코딩을 만드는 방법에 대한 연구를 진행한다. 앞서 진행한
연구결과를 적용하여, 낮은 등급의 0의 인코딩이 없는 경우에도 GGH 함수가 주어진
파라미터에서 안전하지 않음을 보인다.
마지막으로 CLT함수의 경우에는 주어진 공개 정보로부터, 비공개 정보들을 고유
값(eigenvalue) 으로 갖는 정방행렬을 설계하는 방법에 대해 연구를 진행한다. 이를
확장하여, CLT 함수의 모든 비공개 정보들을 복구함으로서 CLT 다중선형함수가
구조적으로 안전하지 않음을 증명한다.
주요어휘: GGH 다중선형함수, 최소 격자 문제, NTRU문제, 아이디얼 격자,
CLT 다중선형함수, 중국인의 나머지 정리 기반 근사 공약수 문제
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